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The Politics of the Law-Politics Dichotomy 
Stephen M. Feldman* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout American history, judges and legal scholars have ar-
ticulated and maintained a sharp separation between law and politics. 
This essay asks the question: Why do so many judges and scholars 
devote so much time and energy to bolstering this law-politics di-
chotomy? Using William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs’s recent article 
“The Law of Interpretation as a Springboard,” this essay explores the 
history and political valence of the dichotomy. From Baude and 
Sach’s perspective, politics is like a disease: if it infects legal interpre-
tation, then it threatens the health of the judicial process. But the his-
tory of the law-politics dichotomy reveals that it empowers legal 
scholars to articulate and judges to implement their political prefer-
ences without acknowledging as much. Politics, it turns out, acts tac-
itly through legal and judicial processes. 
fK==fkqolar`qflk=
President Donald Trump’s nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh 
to the Supreme Court and the recent Senate confirmation hearings 
have thrust the politics of Supreme Court decision-making to the 
forefront of the national stage.1 We have been here before. For ex-
ample, when a Republican-controlled Senate stonewalled Judge Mer-
rick Garland, President Barack Obama’s nominee for the Court, the 
Republican concern was that the moderate liberal Garland would 
shift the justices’ political alignment and change the Court’s direc-
tion.2 Yet, during the Senate hearings on Kavanaugh, previously vet-
 
 *  Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Profes-
sor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. 
 1. Adam Liptak, Brett Kavanaugh, a Conservative Stalwart in Political Fights and on 
the Bench, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brett-
kavanaugh-supreme-court-trump.html; Oliver Roeder & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How 
Conservative Is Brett Kavanaugh?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 17, 2018),   https://fivethirtyeight. 
com/features/how-conservative-is-brett-kavanaugh/. 
 2. Wade Goodwyn & Nina Totenberg, The Case for Republicans to Consider Merrick 
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ted by the conservative Federalist Society, he proclaimed that politics 
will not influence his judicial positions.3 He reiterated this claim in 
his renowned post-hearings Wall Street Journal editorial.4 Every Su-
preme Court nominee must declare that law and politics are separate 
and independent (I refer to this separation as the law-politics dichot-
omy). The nominee must insist that he or she will faithfully follow 
the rule of law while disregarding any political preferences or values.5 
During John Roberts’s confirmation hearings, he famously explained: 
“Judges are like umpires—umpires don’t make the rules; they        
apply them.”6 
Supreme Court nominations and confirmations thus revolve 
around an intermingling of political hardball, on the one hand, and 
declarations about the importance of maintaining a law-politics di-
chotomy, on the other. Justice Neil Gorsuch epitomized this bizarre 
juxtaposition when he toured the state of Kentucky with Senate Ma-
jority Leader Mitch McConnell, the individual most responsible for 
refusing to give Garland a Senate hearing (and thus leaving the Court 
seat open for a subsequent appointee, Gorsuch). While some critics 
labeled the trip a political “victory lap” for the Republicans, Gorsuch 





Garland’s Nomination, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 27, 2016, 1:29PM),  https://www.npr. 
org/2016/10/27/499514065/the-case-for-republicans-to-reconsider-merrick-garlands-nominat 
ion; Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn’t Have to Act on Merrick Garland’s Nominati
on, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/senate-o 
bama-merrick-garland-supreme-court-nominee/482733/. 
 3. Matt Ford, The Misleading Chaos of the Kavanaugh Hearing, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Sept. 4, 2018),  https://newrepublic.com/article/151051/misleading-chaos-kavanaugh-hearing; 
Carolyn Shapiro, Brett Kavanaugh Said Judges Should Just Follow the Law. Here’s Why 
That’s Misleading, FORTUNE (July 10, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/07/10/brett-kavanaugh-
supreme-court-political-views-abortion/. 
 4. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Opinion, I Am an Independent, Impartial Judge, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 4, 2018, 7:30 PM),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-am-an-independent-impartial-judge-1 
538695822. 
 5. MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 5 (2011) (explaining that during confirmation 
hearings, Justice Kagan insisted that her political views would not influence her judicial deci-
sions); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy 
of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 195, 196–97 (2011) (explaining that during 
confirmation hearings, Justice Sotomayor suggested judicial decision-making was mechanical). 
 6. Robert Schwartz, Like They See ‘Em, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A37. 
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and I don’t think there are blue judges. All judges wear black.”7 Gor-
such apparently was not speaking ironically. 
Legal scholars play this game too. A recent and provocative ex-
ample is William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs’s, The Law of Inter-
pretation, which describes two opposing views of legal interpreta-
tion.8 A standard view, according to the authors, emphasizes “the 
ordinary communicative content of . . . legal texts.”9 We discover the 
determinate meaning of a legal text or document, whether the Con-
stitution or otherwise, by relying on the same linguistic conventions 
that we would use for any other text.10 From this standpoint, the legal 
document itself might have political or normative ramifications, but 
the process of discovering its meaning is apolitical. Contrary to this 
standard view, a skeptical view questions the likelihood of legal de-
terminacy.11 Skeptics therefore maintain that a judge or other inter-
preter necessarily injects normative or political preferences into the 
interpretive process.12 
Baude and Sachs reject both these views and articulate a third 
way based on legal rules of interpretation. They focus on “preexisting 
rules—rules of law, and not of language—that determine the legal ef-
fect of written instruments.”13 As between the standard and skeptical 
views, however, Baude and Sachs’s approach leans far toward the 
standard side. For the most part, they seek to show how judges and 
other interpreters can discern a determinate meaning in a legal text. 
 
 7. Robert Barnes, Gorsuch’s Speeches Raise Questions of Independence, Critics Say, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gorsuchs-
speeches-raise-questions-of-independence-critics-say/2017/09/27/5accdb3c-a230-11e7-b14f-f4 
1773cd5a14_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8be148dd47e4; see also Garrett Epps, Ame
rica’s Red and Blue Judges, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politic 
s/archive/2017/09/ americas-red-and-blue-judges/540924/. 
 8. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079 (2017) (describing Baude and Sachs’s interpretation of multiple types of legal documents, 
including statutes and the Constitution. In this Essay, they focus primarily on constitutional 
interpretation). 
 9. Id. at 1086. 
 10. Id.; see also Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 
OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (de-
scribing how Baude and Sachs draw on Mark Greenberg in articulating the standard view). 
 11. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1082. 
 12. Id. at 1092–93 (explaining that Baude and Sachs attribute this skeptical view to Rich-
ard Fallon and Cass Sunstein). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” 
and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015); Cass 
R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193 (2015). 
 13. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1084. 
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For Baude and Sachs, legal interpretation is a specialized field. Thus, 
judges (and other legal interpreters) draw on interpretive rules of law 
specific to legal texts rather than invoking interpretive guidelines per-
tinent to texts in general. Interpreting the Constitution is not the 
same as interpreting a novel. But the crux of the matter, for Baude 
and Sachs, is that legal interpretation (pursuant to legal rules) usually 
uncovers a determinate meaning for a legal text. Consequently, Bau-
de and Sachs are especially concerned with distinguishing their legal-
rules approach from the skeptical view of legal interpretation. 
Baude and Sachs’s article manifests an inveterate form of legal 
scholarship—emphasizing the separation of law and politics. Politics, 
from this perspective, is like a disease: if it infects legal interpretation, 
then it threatens the health of the judicial process. According to Bau-
de and Sachs, something other than politics must govern legal inter-
pretation and adjudication;14 and that “something else is law.”15 Judi-
cial decision-making must be grounded on pure law, unadulterated 
by politics. 
This essay asks the crucial question: Why do so many scholars 
(as well as judges) devote so much time and energy to bolstering the 
law-politics dichotomy? Regardless of Baude and Sachs’s specific in-
tentions, history reveals that this form of scholarship—policing the 
law-politics dichotomy—has significant political ramifications. The 
ostensible maintenance of the law-politics dichotomy empowers legal 
scholars to articulate and judges to implement their political prefer-
ences without acknowledging as much. Politics acts tacitly through 
legal and judicial processes.16 
Part II underscores the numerous ways in which Baude and 
Sachs subscribe to the typical law-politics dichotomy. Part III draws 
on history to explain why many legal scholars, including Baude and 
Sachs, are driven to maintain the separation between law and politics. 
This part emphasizes the politics of the law-politics dichotomy. Part 
IV is a brief conclusion. 
 
 
   14. Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into 
Mayonnaise, 12 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 57 (2014) [hereinafter Feldman, Supreme Court Al-
chemy]. 
 15. Id. at 1093. 
 16. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that judicial decision-making, even at the Su-
preme Court, is purely a manifestation of political ideologies (with law merely being a window-
dressing). See generally Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy, supra note 14 (explaining Supreme 
Court decision-making as a combination of law and politics). 
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When Baude and Sachs summarize the skeptical view of legal in-
terpretation, they repeatedly emphasize that it requires judges to in-
ject their normative or political values into decision-making. Baude 
and Sachs explain that, according to the skeptics, legal interpretation 
“must be defended on normative grounds.”17 Thus, when legal inter-
pretation is indeterminate, the skeptics maintain that a judge “should 
choose the best interpretive outcome as measured against [a variety 
of] normative desiderata . . . .”18 Moreover, skeptics argue that judges 
“freely choose” legal interpretations, producing novel or “new mean-
ings” for legal texts based on “normative reasons.”19 
In criticizing the skeptical view, Baude and Sachs emphasize that 
the intrusion of political or normative preferences into adjudication is 
especially problematic. “Even in disputed cases, lawyers and judges 
needn’t—and usually don’t—make first-best decisions about political 
democracy, the rule of law, or even cost-benefit analysis.”20 Legal in-
terpretation should “not simply [be] left to the normative predilec-
tions of individual judges or officials.”21 Once politics infects the ad-
judicative process, Baude and Sachs fear, it becomes difficult to 
control. Politics is not merely a disease, it is a particularly virulent 
strain of virus, spreading and destroying all in its path. “If the courts 
are allowed to produce new meanings for normative reasons . . . then 
why can’t they produce other, normatively better meanings using 
other, normatively better rules?”22 In other words, once the infection 
of politics takes hold, then judges become crazed vampires (or zom-
bies, if you prefer). They are likely to go rogue, resisting all con-
straint, doing whatever they think is normatively best.23 
Consequently, Baude and Sachs brood about the possibility that 
“judges are unbound by law.”24 Judges cannot be allowed to engage in 
 
 17. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1092–93 (quoting Sunstein, supra note 12, at 193). 
 18. Id. at 1092 (quoting Fallon, supra note 12, at 1305). 
 19. Id. at 1093. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1096. 
 22. Id. at 1093. 
 23. See Jack M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1991) 
(discussing the possibility of a rogue judge). 
 24. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1147. 
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“deliberate acts of lawmaking.”25 If judges themselves can “create and 
apply interpretive rules” rather than being tightly constrained by in-
terpretive law,26 then judges might be “inventing rules of decision out 
of whole cloth.”27 Only adherence to law can inoculate judges from 
the political virus. Law, in most instances, precludes political or nor-
mative decision-making by judges. “Law fills gaps that would other-
wise be filled by the interpreter’s normative priors.”28 Thus, when 
Baude and Sachs observe that, from a “practical” standpoint, textual 
“indeterminacy is serious,”29 they do not panic. The problem is “not 
fatal;”30 law will protect us. “We think there are good reasons to 
think that the law of interpretation can be found and applied much of 
the time.”31 
When it comes to the Constitution, both Baude and Sachs re-
peatedly emphasize that constitutional interpretation is a legal issue 
to be resolved in accord with law.32 Politics is foreign to this process. 
To illustrate correct constitutional decision-making, Baude and Sachs 
discuss United States v. Chambers.33 The case arose from an indict-
ment for bootlegging under the National Prohibition Act. Although 
the government had indicted the defendant during Prohibition, the 
case had not reached final judgment when the Twenty-First Amend-
ment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. The issue was whether 
the Act remained effective despite the end of Prohibition. The Court 
resolved the case by applying a common law rule of interpretation: 
“At common law, repealing a criminal statute would abate a pending 




 25. Id. at 1138. 
 26. Id. (quoting Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: 
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 779 (2013)). 
 27. Id. (quoting Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 
VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015)). 
 28. Id. at 1097. 
 29. Id. at 1140. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). Baude and Sachs admit that law sometimes needs improvement 
or reform. But “that doesn’t mean that judges can and should initiate those reforms according 
to their own normative lights.” Id. at 1097. 
 32. Id. at 1118–20. 
 33. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934); see Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 
1118-20 (discussing Chambers). 
 34. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1119 (citing Chambers, 291 U.S. at 223). 
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its decision: “The question is not one of public policy which the 
courts may be considered free to declare . . . .”35 
Baude and Sachs applaud the Court. “Our view is that the Court 
in Chambers generally got it right, and for the right reasons.”36 And 
while Chambers did not involve reference to the original meaning of 
the constitutional text, both Baude and Sachs unsurprisingly catego-
rize themselves as originalists.37 Furthermore, they conceptualize 
originalism in accord with their emphasis on laws of interpretation. 
In discussing a dispute about different approaches to originalism, 
they maintain that a resolution lies not in historical or linguistic prac-
tices. Rather, the question is “a legal one.”38 They “want to know 
who had the better of the argument, based on the higher-order legal 
rules of the era.”39 Thus, when historians emphasize that historical 
research uncovers political complexities during the framing and rati-
fication era, Baude and Sachs maintain that such research problems 
are, ultimately, beside the point. Despite the historical complexities, 
Baude and Sachs explain that “the focus on law may help us see past 
them.”40 In other words, “[w]hat matters for determining legal con-
tent is the particular type of meaning that the law of interpretation 
chooses. And whatever linguistic answer the legal system chooses, it 
makes this choice as of the date of adoption . . . .”41 The law, from 
this perspective, resolves ambiguity.42 
fffK==efpqlov=^ka=qeb=i^tJmlifqf`p=af`elqljv=
Baude and Sachs are not the first legal scholars to assert that judi-
cial decision-making must be based on law and not politics. Langdel-
 
 35. Chambers, 291 U.S. at 226. 
 36. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1120. 
 37. Id. at 1135–36. 
 38. Id. at 1142. 
 39. Id. at 1141. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1134. 
 42. Baude and Sachs endorse reasonable-person originalism. Id. at 1117–18. According 
to this form of new originalism, judges should ask the following question: How would a reason-
able person, when the Constitution was adopted, have understood the text? E.g., Randy E. Bar-
nett, An Originalism for Non-originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999). Baude and Sachs 
acknowledge that the reasonable person is a legal construct or fiction. Nevertheless, they write: 
“The fiction is useful because it’s a legal fiction, built by our legal rules.” Baude & Sachs, supra 
note 8, at 1118. 
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lian legal scientists,43 in the late-nineteenth century, maintained that 
the legal system was autonomous from society (including politics).44 
Judges were to decide cases in strict logical accord with legal princi-
ples and rules, even if such an approach might lead to injustice.45 Af-
ter World War II, legal process scholars argued that courts must de-
cide constitutional cases pursuant to “neutral principles” of law.46 
Legislatures were to make political decisions, but courts were not to 
do so.47 
Now, in the early-twenty-first century, numerous scholars strug-
gle furiously to maintain and police the law-politics dichotomy. For 
example, in Inside or Outside the System?, Eric A. Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule argued that scholars need to distinguish sharply between 
external and internal analyses of the legal system.48 If a scholar begins 
an article or book by using an external view—for instance, by discuss-
ing the political ideologies of the Supreme Court justices—then the 
scholar should not attempt to switch to an internal view—discussing 
legal principles and rules. The external and internal are incommen-
surable, so a scholar who switches between the two is likely to slip in-
to incoherence.49 Law and politics must be kept separate. Constitu-
tional originalists, perhaps more so than any other contemporary 
scholars, defend and police the law-politics dichotomy. “New 
originalists” argue that judges must interpret the constitutional text 
in accord with its original public meaning.50 Constitutional meaning, 
from this standpoint, is static, fixed at the time of its ratification.51 
 
 43. C.C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 91–105 (2d ed. 1880). 
 44. See C.C. LANGDELL, Preface to the First Edition of CASES ON CONTRACTS viii-ix 
(2d ed. 1879) (explaining Langdell’s approach to law). 
 45. LANGDELL, supra note 43, at 21. 
 46. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15–35 (1959); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 49–59 
(1962) (applying Wechsler’s concept of neutral principles). 
 47. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM 
TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 83–136 (2000) (discussing the legal mod-
ernist quest for objective foundations of law). 
 48. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1743 (2013). 
 49. Posner and Vermeule call this mistake the “inside/outside fallacy.” Id. at 1745–46. 
 50. On the distinction between “old originalism” and “new originalism.” See Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713, 720–24 (2011); Stephen M. 
Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 283, 285–86 (2014). 
 51. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011) (articulating the “fixation thesis”); see Minnesota v. Dick-
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Current political interests and values are irrelevant to the fixed and 
objective meanings embodied in the constitutional text.52 
Obviously, Baude and Sachs are not the only legal scholars to 
worry about the boundary between law and politics. This scholarly 
persistence raises a crucial question: why do so many scholars devote 
so much time and energy to bolstering the law-politics dichotomy? 
From a historical standpoint, there are at least two explanations. The 
first emphasizes a historical drive to articulate and protect a sphere 
of judicial power. The second emphasizes a twentieth-century trans-
formation of democracy and the courts’ subsequent efforts to protect 
judicial power. 
First, since the nation’s founding, many Americans, particularly 
lawyers and judges, have been driven to categorize certain issues as 
legal, distinct from the political. During the early national years, the 
separation between law and politics was far fuzzier than it is today. In 
some states, legislatures performed functions, such as reviewing court 
decisions, now considered judicial. For instance, the Supreme Court 
case, Calder v. Bull, arose when the Connecticut state legislature 
overturned a state probate court decision.53 As Justice Iredell ob-
served, the legislature had been regularly exercising a “superintend-
ing power” over the state courts.54 Meanwhile, judges during this era 
sometimes overtly voiced their partisan political views from the 
bench, especially during grand jury charges.55 
Such overlapping legislative and judicial functions created poten-
tial conflicts between legislatures and courts. In the late 1790s and 
early 1800s, political rancor between the proto-parties of the Federal-
ists and the Jeffersonian Republicans brought these potential conflicts 
to the forefront.56 The courts developed the power of judicial review 
 
erson, 508 U.S. 366, 379–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (articulating a new originalist ap-
proach). 
 52. “Words have original meanings that are fixed no matter what current majorities may 
say to the contrary.” Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009); see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (arguing that only originalism provides an apolitical interpre-
tive method justifying the judicial invalidation of legislation). 
 53. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 54. Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
 55. GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815, 
222 (1981). 
 56. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 
(1993) (discussing political conflicts of 1790s); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN 
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partly in response. By designating certain political issues as law, the 
courts solidified and strengthened judicial power over the designated 
legal issues.57 Simultaneously, the courts ostensibly limited that same 
judicial power by avoiding explicit partisan pronouncements, which 
were deemed appropriate for legislatures.58 
Chief Justice John Marshall played a key role in this development 
of judicial review, particularly with his opinion in Marbury v. Madi-
son.59 As Jennifer Nedelsky explains: “When an issue is designated as 
law, it is insulated not only from the clashes of politics, but from the 
attention of public debate.”60 Going forward, the issue will be dis-
cussed in the technical terms of legal rules and rights—think of con-
tract and property rights—while the political values and assumptions 
underlying the specific right are often obscured.61 The political im-
plications of the distinction between law and politics remain no less 
true and important today than they were in 1800.62 For example, 
when the Supreme Court holds that corporations have a free-speech 
right to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns, 
then Congress is precluded from restricting corporate campaigning. 
The political issue of campaign-spending restrictions is now a legal 
(constitutional) issue supposedly closed to further political debate and 
legislative control. 
Second, the form of American democratic government trans-
formed dramatically during the early-twentieth century. From the 
framing through the 1920s, American government was republican 
democratic.63 Republican democracy revolved around two substantive 
principles: civic virtue and the common good. During the republican 
democratic era, virtuous citizens and officials supposedly pursued the 
 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1993) (discussing political conflicts of 1790s). 
 57. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 190 (1990). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 5, at 
95 (discussing how the Federalist-Republican political conflict led to Marbury). 
 60. NEDELSKY, supra note 57, at 198. 
 61. Id. at 188-99. 
 62. On the developing concept of judicial review, see SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990); William Michael Treanor, Judicial 
Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005); and Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of 
Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 787 (1999). 
 63. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY 14–290 (2008) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION]. 
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common good rather than their own partial or private interests.64  
Republican democratic theory thus facilitated the exclusion of      
numerous societal groups from the democratic polity: any ostensibly 
non-virtuous individuals and groups could be excluded.65 With this 
significant limit on political participation, republican democracy 
flourished within the confines of the rural and agrarian nineteenth-
century America.66 
Around the turn into the twentieth century, industrialization,  
urbanization, and immigration weakened the republican democratic 
regime until it was supplanted in the 1930s.67 The new regime,     
pluralist democracy, emphasized widespread participation.68 Accord-
ing to pluralist democratic theory, the government no longer man-
dated the pursuit of any particular substantive goal—the common 
good. Instead, the government provided a process or procedural 
framework that supposedly allowed all individuals and societal groups 
to press their diverse interests and values in the democratic arena.69 
In our current pluralist democratic regime, fair and open democratic 
processes are crucial. For instance, the right to vote cannot be denied 
or diluted.70 
Under republican democracy, courts typically reviewed govern-
ment actions to confirm that they promoted the common good rather 
than partial or private interests. Pluralist democracy, though, no 
longer revolved around the common good, so what then became of 
the courts? What useful function could courts play in the new plural-
ist democratic regime? A judicial role emerged, in part, by invigorat-
ing the distinction between law and politics. As pluralist democracy 
evolved, a key judicial function emerged: policing the democratic 
process.71 Courts were to ensure that all individuals and groups were 
able to assert their respective political interests and values and thus 
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 66. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 63, at 14–45; SANDEL, supra note 65, at 
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 67. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 63, at 166–97. 
 68. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL 254–57, 362–66 (1990) (discussing 
the transformation of ethnic urbanites into active participants on the national political stage). 
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fully participate in the democratic arena. From this perspective, 
courts should articulate and uphold legal rights, such as voting and 
free expression, which constitute the procedural framework for the 
political battles and compromises that arise among competing inter-
est groups and individuals.72 Consequently, according to pluralist 
democratic theory, the judicial function is purely legal. Judges protect 
the legal framework for political debate but do not themselves enun-
ciate political values and interests.73 Thus, scholars and judges might 
brood about the counter-majoritarian difficulty—that courts overturn 
the decisions of elected representatives of the people—and therefore 
emphasize the need for judicial restraint, but the courts remain justi-
fied in exercising their power.74 
The two historical explanations for the law-politics dichotomy 
share a common theme. Namely, political forces drive the mainte-
nance of the law-politics dichotomy: the sharp separation of law and 
politics has a political payoff. Under both historical explanations, 
lawyers and judges trace, justify, and protect a realm of power—legal-
judicial power—by distinguishing that realm from politics. Supposed-
ly, within the legal-judicial realm, only lawyers and judges are trained 
and equipped with sufficient knowledge to understand and resolve le-
gal issues and disputes. In other words, the lay public might be em-
powered to debate political issues, vote, and otherwise participate in 
democracy, but they are ill-equipped to understand, discuss, and re-
solve legal issues.75 
The paradox, of course, is that courts justify and increase their 
political power by denying their political power. Judges are empow-
ered to decide cases in accord with their political views partly because 
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they maintain that they are rigidly following the law. Given this, 
judges and legal scholars have strong incentives to present their posi-
tions as being apolitical or neutral. Thus, in constitutional jurispru-
dence, originalists have gained the political upper-hand by insisting 
that originalism is the only apolitical method of constitutional inter-
pretation.76 Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the most conservative jus-
tices since World War II, persistently decided cases in accord with 
his political views.77 Yet, Scalia persuaded numerous scholars, judges, 
and much of the general public to believe that his subscription to 
originalism rendered his judicial decisions apolitical (though his judi-
cial opinions often disregarded originalist sources).78 
fsK==`lk`irpflk=
The message from Baude and Sachs is that law and politics must 
be separate. They fear, though, that legal interpretation can open the 
door to judicial politics—or at least, the interpretive skeptics argue as 
much. Therefore, Baude and Sachs seek to avoid open-ended legal 
interpretation and the correlative interpretive politics. To do so, they 
invoke the shield of law. Instead of allowing judges (and other inter-
preters) to become embroiled in the politics of interpretation, Baude 
and Sachs want judges to rely on the law of interpretation. 
Regardless of their intentions, Baude and Sachs’s article fits in a 
long scholarly tradition: namely, they seek to police the law-politics 
dichotomy. And as the history of the law-politics dichotomy demon-
strates, the maintenance of the dichotomy has significant political  
valence. The law-politics dichotomy underscores that lawyers and 
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judges are professionals educated in an arcane and technical realm 
that is beyond the understanding of laypersons. Consequently, the 
public must rely on the legal profession to resolve legal disputes ra-
ther than treating such disputes as being open to political debate and 
democratic resolution. 
Baude and Sachs conclude their article with the following mes-
sage: “We don’t claim to have produced all of the answers here, but 
we hope that we can lead others to ask the right questions.”79 Ironi-
cally, though, Baude and Sachs point scholars to exactly the wrong 
questions. Legal scholars should finally stop the hoary practice of 
bolstering the ostensible law-politics dichotomy. In fact, an increas-
ing number of political scientists and legal scholars now recognize 
that law and politics intertwine in judicial decision making.80 Rejec-
tion of the law-politics dichotomy does not mean that judicial deci-
sion-making is all politics, even at the Supreme Court.81 Instead, legal 
interpretation and judicial decision-making intertwine law and poli-
tics. Judicial decision-making, we might say, is animated by a law-
politics dynamic.82 For the most part, judges sincerely interpret the 
law, but legal interpretation is never mechanical; judges’ political val-
ues necessarily influence their interpretive conclusions.83 Thus, even 
if there are legal rules of interpretation, as Baude and Sachs argue, 
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those rules still must be interpreted. Laws of interpretation do not 
avoid or escape interpretive politics. If anything, we should be direct-
ing scholars to devote more resources to exploring the law-politics 
dynamic at the heart of adjudication. Maybe then we could stop pre-
tending that politically vetted Supreme Court nominees, like Brett 
Kavanaugh, disregard their political values once they reach 
the Court. 
